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ABSTRACT: The idea of selling membership into society is not new, but it has taken on 
new life with the recent proliferation globally of Immigrant Investor Programs (IIPs). 
These programs involve the sale of national membership privileges to wealthy foreigners. 
They are justified by attractive policy objectives: to stimulate economic development and 
attract engaged investor-migrants. But they are often plagued by failures to achieve either 
of these two goals. This paper surveys the universe of IIPs, reviews their objectives, 
activities and performance, and explores how they might be improved. We develop a two-
dimensional typology for distinguishing IIPs according to types of criteria they impose on 
program applicants: (i) wealth criteria and (ii) engagement criteria. We map out four 
distinct immigrant investor strategies that emerge out of these different IIP criteria: 
Aspiring Astronauts, Absent Oligarchs, Migrant Mayors and Pioneer Patrons. By 
analyzing which IIP criteria encourage which strategies, we highlight common 
mismatches between stated objectives and embedded incentives, helping to explain why 
many IIPs report poor economic and immigration policy outcomes. We also contemplate 
solutions. In particular, we observe that the success of an IIP depends upon the coming-
together of expertise from two domains—migration policy and investment management—
and we draw upon insights from successful Sovereign Development Funds (SDFs), which 
likewise must simultaneously achieve public policy and financial goals. We propose a set 
of principles to guide the emergence of a new type of SDF: Immigrant Investment Funds 
(IIFs). We also indicate how such vehicles might help address urgent issues around 
migration and refugees, for example by investing in refugee and migrant entrepreneurship 
and in the infrastructures needed to incorporate newcomers, thereby demonstrating the 
public value of immigration at a time when anti-immigrant rhetoric has become a serious 
irritant in world politics. 
 
KEYWORDS: Immigrant investor programs; immigrant investment funds; highly-skilled 
immigration policy; economic citizenship; financial citizenship; civic buyout; 
entrepreneur citizenship 
  
                                                          
 
† Director, Australian Population and Migration Research Centre, University of Adelaide / Visiting Scholar, 
Stanford University. Corresponding Author: alan.gamlen@adelaide.edu.au. 
‡ Fellow, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford / Advisor, Dundee Securities. 
















  1 
2. What are Immigrant Investor Programs 
 
  3 
2.1 Why do governments establish IIPs? 
 
  5 
                   Objective #1: Attracting wealth 
 
  5 
                   Objective #2: Cultivating ‘engagement’ 
 
  8 
2.2  What level of wealth and engagement do IIPs require 
 
10 
3. Who migrates via Immigrant Investor Programs? 
 
13 
              3.1 What motivates immigrant investors? 
 
15 
              3.2 What opportunity structures do IIPs create for migrants? 
 
16 
4. How can IIPs be improved? 
 
19 
             4.1 What concerns have IIPs raised? 
 
20 
                  Concern #1: Poor economic outcomes 
 
20 
                  Concern #2: Poor economic engagement 
 
23 
             4.2 How should the capital attracted by the Immigrant  






     Acknowledgements 
 
35 
     References 
 
36 
     Annex 44 








The idea of selling membership in society is not new. The French sold noble titles going 
back to at least the 16th century. The practice reached a peak under the reign of Louis XIV 
(r.1643-1715), when titles were sold to wealthy commoners both to finance war and to 
expand the technical capacity of the state (Lucas 1973). The practice became so common 
that the King’s diarist, the Duke of Saint-Simon (1675-1755), went so far as to describe it 
as ‘the reign of the vile bourgeoisie’.5  His revulsion stemmed not just from fear of having 
to share noble privileges with commoners. It also expressed the widely held belief that 
‘titles of nobility contain no merit unless they reside upon virtue’—which at that time 
meant civic virtue: ‘the interest in, care for, and adeptness at the defense’ of public affairs 
(Lucas 1973: 99-100). In a word, he feared that the sale of nobility, as a form of public 
office, amounted to corruption. 
 
An echo of these protests is found today in the concerns that citizens in wealthy countries 
voice regarding the rise of Immigrant Investor Programs (IIPs), which involve the sale of 
national membership privileges to wealthy foreigners. These citizens also fear that civic 
virtues are debased whenever their governments offer ‘citizenships for sale’. IIPs have 
spread globally in recent years, taking a variety of forms but everywhere representing an 
exchange of residency or citizenship rights for financial capital. Our research found 60 
different IIPs in 57 countries, and half of those were set up since the year 2000. These 
programs present governments with an opportunity to convert the inherent appeal and 
attraction of their state into financial wealth for economic development. Such efforts merit 
                                                          
5 Colin Lucas 1973, “Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French Revolution, Past & Present, No. 60 
(Aug., 1973), pp. 84-126, especially pages 97-100 
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the attention of scholars and indeed policymakers from migration, development and 
sovereign wealth management fields because, ultimately, the rise of IIPs presents 
important conceptual and practical challenges for theories about citizenship, sovereignty 
and global governance in the 21st century.  
 
This paper documents the rise of IIPs, reviews the available information on their 
objectives, activities and performance, and explores how they might be improved. The 
body of the paper has three sections. In Section I we ask what IIPs are and examine why 
governments establish them. We identify two policy objectives driving the establishment 
of IIPs that are embedded in their application criteria: (1) attracting wealth and (2) 
cultivating what we call ‘engagement’. In Section II of the paper we ask who migrates via 
IIPs. First we examine the geographic and socio-economic origins of immigrant investors 
and summarize existing literature on their motivations. We then build on this by 
identifying the opportunity structures that IIPs create for migrants. We outline four types 
of immigrant investor strategies that different IIP criteria are likely to incentivize, and we 
analyze which IIPs in our review align with which type. In Section III we ask how the 
performance of IIPs could be improved, first by examining documented concerns raised 
to-date about IIPs, then by suggesting ways that future IIPs might better meet their wealth 
and engagement objectives. We observe that fulfilling the dual objectives of IIPs depends 
upon the coming-together and coordination of expertise from two domains—migration 
policy and investment management by public entities—in order to yield two distinct but 
inseparable outcomes: actively engaged immigrant investors, and a demonstrable public 
benefit from the funds the programs generate.  
 
In light of these considerations, we conclude with insights from the financial literature on 
Sovereign Development Funds (SDFs). Well-designed SDFs pursue double bottom-line 
objectives, often comprising for-profit financial motives with extra-financial public and 
developmental requirements. Immigrant Investment Funds (IIFs) could be designed under 
similar governance models, albeit tailored to the unique needs of IIPs and local 
geographies. Overall, the aim of this project is by no means to say the final word on IIPs 
and IIFs, but instead to stimulate a much-needed research agenda on the topic. Among 
other things, we see this agenda exploring the unique opportunities that IIFs may present, 
in the context of the current global crisis, to stimulate new investment linked to refugees 
and migrants. IIFs could help build countries’ capacity to share responsibility for global 
 3  
population movements, by investing in immigrant and refugee entrepreneurship and in the 
development of necessary public infrastructure in refugee and immigrant receiving states. 
In doing so IIFs could play a role comparable to that of the Nansen Stamp Fund, which 
helped solve the refugee crisis following the Russian Revolution, and demonstrate the 
public value of immigration at a time when nativist rhetoric threatens to poison politics 
around the world.  
2. What are Immigrant Investor Programs?  
Immigrant Investor Programs (IIPs) are an exchange of national membership rights for 
immigrants’ financial and human capital. IIPs represent an innovative and increasingly 
common mechanism that allows governments to, in effect, monetize the allure of their 
countries to migrants, thereby converting intangible assets into financial assets. These 
programs range from the USA’s EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program (the world’s largest), 
which offers permanent residence in exchange for a job-creating investment of 
US$500,000 to US$1 million; to Malta’s straight-up offer of citizenship in exchange for 
a €650,000 payment to the Malta National Development Fund (Wilbur 2014); to tiny 
Kiribati’s now defunct US$20,000 ‘Investor Passport’ program, which until 2004 offered 
visa-free access to the 80+ countries with which Kiribati shares visa-waiver agreements.  
Figure 1: Sampling the Range of Immigrant Investor Programs (IIPs)
 
Source data: See Appendix. 
 
Country Canada Cayman Islands Malta Nauru United States
Program name Immigrant Investor 
Venture Capital Pilot 
Program
Investor Residency 






Years in operation 2015- 2003- 2014- 1997-2005 1990-
Benefit to migrant Permanent Residence 25-year Residence Citizenship Citizenship Conditional 2-yr 
Green Card
Permanent residence 
if 10 jobs created
Wealth criteria US $1.5 million 
investment over 15 
years in Venture 
Capital fund and 
assets of US$7.6 
million. Tertiary 
qualification (1 year 
+). English or French 
proficiency.
US$1.9 millon in real 
estate or assets over 
US$7.3 millon plus 
US$1.2 millon in a 
business. Good 
health.
US$380,000 in real 
estate or property 
lease (US$17,000 p/a) 







for 5 years. Min 
US$54,000. Health 
Insurance.
US$15,000 fee. US$1 million 
investment over 5 
years which creates 




program that creates 
or sustains at least 10 
local jobs for 5 years.
Engagement criteriaReside in country for 
2 years during 5 year 
period, not in 
Québec.
Good character. Resident in Malta in 
12 preceding months 
to application.
None Be engaged in 
managerial duties or 
policy formulation of 
business. Reside in 
country 219 days p/a.
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half of which have emerged since the year 2000 (see Figure 2).6  It is estimated that 36,500 
investor visas were issued globally in 2014, with a handful of high-income English-
speaking destinations (the US, Canada, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Australia) 
accounting for a large majority. Most other countries offer fewer than 200 IIP entrants 
each year.7   
 
Many countries run multiple IIPs with distinct qualifying criteria and benefits. For 
example, Australia offers three—‘Investor’, ‘Significant Investor’ and ‘Premium 
Investor’—to immigrants who commit AU$1.5 million, AU$5 million and AU$25 
million, respectively. The global IIP landscape is also characterized by considerable churn. 
Roughly 10 percent of all programs, small and large, have been disestablished and replaced 
with revised versions in the past 15 years. In 2014, Canada, an IIP pioneer, closed down 
its program after a 28-year run, amidst media coverage of real estate inflation attributed to 
the program and a bloated applications backlog. It was replaced with an Immigrant 
Investment Venture Capital Pilot Program in 2015, with higher investment thresholds and 
new human capital criteria. 
 
Over 90 percent of the IIPs we found are located in High Income countries (63 percent) or 
Upper Middle Income countries (30 percent) at the core of the global economy. In North 
America, both the US and Canada operate IIPs. Most Western European countries, and 
some Central and Eastern European countries, also run programs, as do Australia and New 
Zealand, and the advanced Asian economies—such as Japan, Hong Kong, Korea and 
Singapore. 
 
                                                          
6 Our scan of immigrant investor programs began with a review of existing academic studies. Although these 
studies are relatively up-to-date, none attempt an exhaustive map of all existing programs. Therefore, we built 
significantly upon these partial databases by reference to open government sources, including websites, 
legislative documents or statements from officials. Despite our best efforts to be exhaustive, we recognize that it 
is not, given inherent limitations to our approach. In particular, information is less complete and reliable 
regarding the programs of states with low levels of online government and/or data transparency. In a number of 
cases, open-source review was merely able to determine the existence of an immigrant investor program, and 
did not support detailed analysis of its composition or history. We supplemented official data with data supplied 
by media outlets and private sector brokerage companies, but only where such data could be corroborated by 
other sources. Brokerage companies proved an important archive of information regarding immigrant investor 
programs that have since been discontinued (and thus, have been removed from official sites). Cited statistics 
and data were sourced directly from government publications and market research reports. 
7 Our estimation takes into account 41 operational IIPs, of which the top 5 destination countries (Australia, 
Canada, Hong Kong, UK, USA) make up just over 80 percent of all visa grants. 
 5  
Figure 2: Countries with Immigrant Investor Programs, by region, 1975-20158 
 
Source data: See Appendix. 
These IIPs primarily monetize the value inherent in standards of living and quality of life 
available to citizens and residents of these countries. Other programs are hosted by satellite 
states and territories on the peripheries of the global economy: by small island nations such 
as Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize and the Caymans; and by small mainland 
states such as Panama and Costa Rica. These programs monetize the value inherent in the 
international freedom of movement and tax-haven access available to passport holders 
from these countries.  
 
2.1.  Why do governments establish IIPs? 
 
The present IIP landscape remains exceptionally diverse, reflecting ongoing policy 
experimentation. However, we observe considerable convergence among IIPs, to the 
extent that we feel confident in identifying two key policy objectives in this area: (1) 
attracting wealth, and (2) cultivating what we call ‘engagement’. Below we explain these 
objectives and discuss how various IIPs in our review aim to achieve them.  
 
Objective #1: Attracting wealth 
 
IIPs aim to attract wealth in two main forms: financial capital and human capital. In a 
climate of shrinking public budgets, IIPs aim to help governments raise the financial 
                                                          
8 Counts include countries only, not other territories (e.g. Jersey, Quebec). Countries with multiple IIP streams 
are counted only once. Counts are therefore conservative. 
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capital needed to provide the core traditional benefits of citizenship—by monetizing that 
very status. All the IIPs we reviewed aim to raise financial capital, but different countries 
command very different prices for entry. At the lower end of the spectrum, several Pacific 
Island states offer, or have offered, ‘investor passports’ for very small sums of cash 
(Kiribati, US$15,000; Fiji, US$23,000). A little higher up the scale are island states on the 
peripheries of the US and Europe: Antigua and Barbuda and St Kitts and Nevis both 
provide investor passports for US$250,000, while Malta charges US$824,000. Investor 
access to large wealthy countries is priced at the high end. For example, to qualify for 
residency in France requires a €10 million investment into domestic industrial or 
commercial assets. Austria’s limited citizenship-by-investment program is rumored to 
entail a €2 million donation or US$10 million recoverable investment (Wilbur 2014).  
 
IIP financial commitment criteria appear in two general forms: private investments and 
monies given directly to the government (Sumption and Hooper 2014). A little over half 
(53 percent) of the IIPs in our study allow applicants to put up risk capital.9  Commonly 
accepted forms of risk capital include investment into real estate, stocks, managed funds 
and active businesses. Around a quarter of the programs (28 percent) allow applicants to 
invest in recoverable deposits,10  such as the purchase of government bonds or 
maintenance of a minimum onshore bank account balance. In 19 percent of cases the 
financial capital commitments are more accurately classified as fees than investments, 
since the investor migrant is not entitled to recover any portion. 
 
Private investments may be loosely channeled to or from particular geographical areas or 
economic sectors. For example, the US nudges immigrant investments into target regions, 
while Latvia draws them toward major cities. Real estate investments qualify for entry to 
the Bahamas, the United Arab Emirates, Greece and Malta, but not the UK or Australia 
(where they fuel concerns about housing-market inflation). More often, IIPs recognize 
almost any kind of private investment, which is then simply absorbed into the wider 
economy. Costa Rica’s IIP lets investors sink their US$200,000 into any ‘productive’ 
project of ‘national interest’, whether in real estate, registered goods, shares, stocks, or 
                                                          
9 Defined as monies invested into an asset for a specified holding period, whose recovery or return is uncertain 
and depends upon the asset’s financial performance or market value. 
10 Defined as monies lent out for a specified lending period, whose recovery—sometimes, with interest—may be 
wholly or partially insured. 
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anything else. IIPs in Germany, the Netherlands, Bulgaria and elsewhere in Europe are 
similarly open. 
 
Monies given direct to the government are typically absorbed into the wider treasury rather 
than reserved for specific purposes. Switzerland’s IIP takes an annual lump-sum tax 
straight into general revenue. Many other IIPs require the purchase of generic government 
bonds which can be used towards objectives such as building public infrastructure, 
including roads, schools, water treatment or disaster recovery (one case being New 
Zealand’s ‘Kiwi Bonds’). Cyprus counts ‘financial participation in an infrastructure 
project’ towards eligibility (Cyprus Ministry of the Interior 2014).  
 
In a few cases, IIPs channel revenues into institutional investment vehicles, or Immigrant 
Investment Funds (IIFs), with the capacity to manage those revenues toward specific 
policy purposes. Malta’s IIF, the National Development and Social Fund, is mandated to 
‘contribute to major projects of national importance’, including initiatives in ‘education, 
research, innovation, justice and the rule of law, employment and public health’ (Identity 
Malta 2014). British Columbia’s Immigrant Investment Fund (BCIIF) was set up to 
manage that province’s share of the funds generated by Canada’s previous Immigrant 
Investor Program (which was terminated in 2014). Its mandate was to invest in public 
infrastructure (to lower the borrowing costs to taxpayers of such projects) and venture 
capital (to promote jobs and investment), with a smaller share put into recoverable deposits 
to help ensure the stable financial performance of the fund.  
 
Many IIPs also impose human capital requirements, in line with broader trends in 
immigration policies designed to link human capital with innovation and economic growth 
(e.g. Challinor 2011). Many IIPs require applicants to demonstrate qualities such as 
‘talent’ (Andorra, France) ‘skills’, ‘education’, or ‘qualifications’ (Hong Kong, France, 
Canada). Some require ‘experience’ in areas such as ‘business’, ‘management’, or 
‘investment’ (e.g. Australia, Quebec, Japan), or in the fields of ‘science’ or ‘culture’ (e.g. 
Austria, Jersey, Guernsey). Most IIPs require applicants to be in good health. The kind of 
human capital most widely prized by IIPs is an amalgam of all the above: 
‘entrepreneurship’, an elusive attribute named by IIPs in Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, New Zealand, Spain and the UK, amongst others.  
However, human capital requirements are not a universal feature of IIPs. Germany’s IIP 
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requires job-creating investment and a commitment to residency, but no specific skills 
other than ‘sufficient knowledge of German language and culture’. Similarly, the 
Netherlands requires no specific business skills, although it does require immigrant 
investors to pass a ‘civic integration test’ to prove their understanding of the language and 
society. IIPs in both the UK and US require ‘language proficiency’ and ‘engagement in 
day-to-day management’ of the investment, but no other specific skills or experience. 
Around half the IIPs we reviewed impose no human capital criteria beyond knowing the 
language and having other kinds of socio-cultural fluency needed to integrate. These 
competencies were related to another common underlying immigration policy aim, which 
we call ‘cultivating engagement’. 
 
Objective #2: Cultivating ‘engagement’ 
 
Immigration policies are often evaluated on their ‘settlement outcomes’, measured in 
terms of immigrants’ ability to participate actively in various spheres of the destination 
society—including the economy, the political process, and everyday community life. Ideas 
of ‘settlement’ are complex, covering hotly contested concepts such as ‘assimilation’ 
(Gordon 1964), ‘integration’ (Joppke 2007), ‘multi-culturalism’ (Parekh 2000), ‘social 
cohesion’ (Vertovec 1999), and ‘active citizenship’ (Kearns 1995)—to name just a few. 
Without rehearsing these debates in full, we note that many IIPs require immigrant 
investors to participate actively (rather than passively) in the economy and broader 
community of settlement. We think of these as engagement requirements.  
 
Since ancient times, the idea of citizenship has been based around shared residence and 
engagement in the public life of a particular place. In line with this traditional emphasis, 
physical residence is required by some of the IIPs we reviewed. At the top end of 
commitment, Monaco requires continuous residence for a 10-year period. A number of 
other countries require an ‘intention’ to reside permanently. However, residence 
requirements are often reduced or omitted completely from IIP criteria. Acquiring a visa 
through the Portuguese IIP demands just seven days of residency in the first year, and 14 
days every two years thereafter. In a few cases residency is not even part of the transaction: 
the now-defunct Kiribati Investor Passport neither granted the bearer residence nor 
demanded it, but merely monetized Kiribati’s visa-free access to other countries.  
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This flexibility around IIP residence requirements suggests that they are often less 
intended to promote traditional forms of citizen engagement (e.g. in civil society and the 
public sphere), and more as a means of cultivating what might be thought of as economic 
engagement. For most IIPs, the baseline level of active economic engagement is 
‘economic self-sufficiency’—that is, no dependency on public health, education and 
welfare support. For some, the investor is explicitly required to be self-employed; 
Quebec’s IIP states that applicants ‘must come to Québec to create their own job’ 
(Gouvernement du Québec 2014). Other forms of employment are sometimes forbidden 
(e.g. Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Greece).  
 
About a third of IIPs (36 percent) require more demanding levels of economic 
engagement. The US’s EB-5 program requires the investor to ‘be engaged in day-to-day 
managerial duties or have input into policy formulation’ (U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services 2015). Applicants to Australia’s ‘Significant Business History’ visa 
stream have to ‘maintain substantial ownership, direct and continuous involvement in the 
day-to-day management of the business, [and] make decisions that affect the overall 
direction and performance of the business in a way that benefits the Australian economy’ 
(Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2015). Entrants through the 
‘Venture Capital Entrepreneur’ stream must have ‘a genuine and realistic commitment to 
continuously maintain an ownership interest and engagement in business and/or 
investment’ (ibid.). A number of IIPs specify that the investment must actively promote 
the public good in some way. For example, Panama’s program requires investment in 
government-approved agriculture or reforestation projects. The majority of IIPs, however, 
allow wealthy immigrants to passively park wealth in the destination country, or pay what 
amounts to a one-off (albeit substantial) entry fee. 
 
A minority of IIPs temper their emphasis on economic engagement by acknowledging 
more traditional citizenship expectations. For entrants through Singapore’s ‘Global 
Investor Program’, their male offspring, like everyone else’s, are liable for National 
Service up to the age of 21. Fiji’s IIP requires that ‘the holder shall not behave in any 
manner prejudicial to peace, good order, good government or morals’ (Fiji High 
Commission 2015). Romania’s IIP requires not just knowledge of the ‘language, culture, 
constitution and national anthem’, but also ‘loyalty to the Romanian State’ (Dzankic 
2015). A few programs expect entrants to understand, or commit to, national ‘values’ 
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(Australia), or to sign an oath of allegiance (Tonga). In Slovakia, citizenship can be granted 
to people of special economic benefit if they display good character, a clean criminal 
record, ‘reasonable knowledge of Slovakian language and culture, and fulfil their tax and 
other legal obligations’. However, most IIPs simply require applicants ‘of good character’, 
i.e., a bare minimum of public regard demonstrated by respect for the law.  
 
2.2. What levels of wealth and engagement do IIPs require? 
 
Conceiving IIP objectives in terms of these two dimensions, attracting wealth and 
cultivating engagement, encapsulates some key issues—and so we explore this approach 
further in Figure 3. We assign each IIP in our sample with a score between 1 and 5 on each 
dimension and generate a schematic scatter chart. On the wealth dimension, all programs 
require some kind of investment, so none are scored at zero. We assigned 1 point for a 
financial capital requirement of up to US$50,000; 2 for a minimum investment of 
US$51,000-200,000; 3 for US$201,000-$800,000; 4 for US$801,000-$1.5 million, and 5 
for commitments above US$1.5 million. Where programs fell on the threshold between 
one wealth score and the next, we took human capital requirements into consideration. On 
the engagement dimension, we assigned a zero where no criteria are specified; 1 for 
minimal requirements such as a brief visit to renew documents or self-sufficiency; and 2-
3 for demanding an ‘intention’ to reside permanently or some other significant but not 
necessarily onerous or enforceable obligation (e.g., signing a values statement or agreeing 
to act in the national economic interest). A lengthy residence requirement (e.g. of tax 
residency length) was scored around 4, as were requirements to be actively involved in 
investment management. Anything judged more onerous than this scored a 5. These 
rankings are schematic, not scientific. 
 
Most programs cluster in the bottom-left quadrant of the chart, with low to middling wealth 
requirements, and very low engagement requirements. A disproportionate number of 
countries in this quadrant are small-island tax havens, although a few Southeastern 
European fringe states also feature. Many of the IIPs listed in this quadrant had been 
disestablished by the time of our review. The next most populated is the top-left quadrant, 
indicating IIPs with high wealth thresholds but low to middling engagement requirements. 
This quadrant features current IIPs, notably from a mix of English-speaking and non-
English-speaking high-income OECD countries. Only a few IIPs fall into the top-right 
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quadrant, indicating high thresholds for both wealth and engagement—the largest current 
programs are among these. The bottom-right quadrant of the chart is sparsely populated: 
IIPs tend not to combine low wealth criteria with high engagement criteria. The results of 
this schematic analysis hint at some of the concerns that these programs raise. Before 
discussing those concerns in Section III, we now turn to the question of who these distinct 
IIP migration channels tend to attract. 
 12  
  
Figure 3: IIPs ranked their by wealth and engagement criteria 
 
Source data: See Appendix.
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3. Who migrates via Immigrant Investor Programs? 
 
Immigrant investors comprise a small fraction of ‘highly-skilled migrants’, who in turn 
form a small fraction of the 250 million people currently living outside their birth countries 
(UN Population Division. 2015). Of the estimated 17 million migrants who cross borders 
around the world each year, well under a million are highly-skilled migrants (Goldin, 
Cameron and Balarajan 2012: 124-125). However, the increasing skills-based selectivity 
of immigration policies means that highly skilled immigrants form a disproportionate 
number of entrants to developed countries such as Canada, the US, New Zealand and 
Australia (e.g. see Canadian Immigration Office, 2014). 
 
Moreover, the scale of highly-skilled migration is set to grow. Wealth is increasing 
globally, but spreading unevenly within and among countries. Within developing 
countries, many remain poor, but a growing few are obtaining the resources to get out. 
Emigration rates are highest in middle-income ranges, because the poorest of the poor lack 
the means to escape their predicament, while the wealthiest typically lack the incentive 
(Martin and Taylor 1996). This helps explain why popular IIPs receive most of their 
applications from members of the new middle- and upper-classes in rapidly developing 
middle-income countries, and not from the poorest or richest countries (see Figure 4).  
 
To borrow terminology from the wealth management industry, the main targets of IIPs are 
‘high net worth’ (HNW) households, which control private wealth of US$1 million or 
more. Globally, about 34 million people live within HNW households—0.7 percent of the 
world’s population (Credit Suisse, 2015).11  There is a broad range even within this tiny 
elite: wealth managers refer to lower-HNW (US$1-$20 million in private wealth), upper-
HNW (US$20-$100 million), and ultra-HNW (US$100 million and above). By 2014, 38 
percent of global, high net-worth household wealth resided in the developing world, a 
share projected to rise to 45 percent by 2019 (Boston Consulting Group, 2015).12  China 
now has the second-highest number of millionaire households in the world (four million), 
behind only the US (seven million) (ibid). 
 
                                                          
11 Refer to Credit Suisse’s ‘Global Wealth Report 2015’. 
12 Refer to The Boston Consulting Group’s ‘Global Wealth 2015: Winning the Growth Game’. 
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Figure 5 shows the relative size and origin-country breakdown of the intake pools for four 
of the world’s most popular IIPs: the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Chinese 
nationals make up the majority of entrants in each of the first three. The US EB-5 program 
experienced dramatic growth over the last decade, from just over 500 visas in 2006 to over 
9,200 visas in 2014 (US State Department 2014). More than 8,500 of the visas issued in 
2014 went to mainland Chinese applicants, up from just 63 in 2006 (ibid). Canada has seen 
a similar regional shift and growth in applicant mix. 
 
 




Source: Koutsoukis, A., Davies, J. B., Lluberas, R., Stierli, M., & Shorrocks, A., 2015. 




Between 1990 and 2014, the share of investment-class migrants coming to Canada from 
China rose from approximately 10 percent to nearly 60 percent of the total annual cohort 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012 and 2014). When Canada terminated its long-
standing IIP in 2014, the vast majority of the 65,000 applicants in the program’s six-year 
backlog were from mainland China. 
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3.1.  What motivates immigrant investors?  
 
Fundamentally, IIPs allow wealthy individuals and households to maintain transnational lives 
in a world where their money can cross borders more easily than they can themselves. In this 
study we collected data on IIPs but not on the migrants who participate in them 
 
Figure 5: IIP migrants by country of origin 
 
 
Source data: Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2014, Canadian Immigration 
Office 2012, Immigration New Zealand 2014, US State Department 2014. Authors’ analysis. 
 
However, following Sumption and Hooper (2014), and drawing on both anecdotal and 
survey evidence from the investor-class immigration industry, the range of specific 
motivations of immigrant investors can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. To fast-track access to favourable education, healthcare, air quality and other 
public goods. Immigration laws and regulations are complex and can be time-
consuming to navigate. IIPs allow wealthy individuals and households to bypass 
many of these procedures en route to securing improved welfare conditions 
(sometimes provoking protests at their perceived ‘queue jumping’). A 2015 
immigration consulting industry white paper on high-net-worth individuals’ 
emigration motivations found improved access to education (both in terms of 
quality and lower tuition fees) to be the most commonly-cited motivation among 
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wealthy Chinese emigrants, followed by dissatisfaction with domestic pollution 
levels (Hurun Report and Visas Consulting Group 2015). 
  
2. To insure against political and economic risk. Many immigrant investors come 
from developing countries where various forms of instability may threaten their 
wealth. ‘If you’re from a country that’s politically unstable, where you’re not sure 
what the future holds, you want to have an alternative,’ explained the managing 
partner of a second immigration advisory firm, Henley. Arton Capital, a Canadian 
immigration advisory group, claims that a majority of its Middle East applicants 
are motivated to seek a second citizenship by regional unrest (Underwood 2015). 
IIPs allow them to park wealth and family members in safer locations (occasionally 
raising issues about ‘dirty money’ and poorly integrated dependents).  
 
3. To access visa-waiver countries. Developing-country passport-holders often enjoy 
visa-free temporary access to very few foreign countries. This can be a severe 
limitation when conducting international business or consuming global lifestyle 
goods. IIPs may allow such investors to access a wider range of territories without 
the need to apply for a visa (this can create concerns about fraud, and occasionally 
lead to the cancellation of visa-waiver agreements). The same Canadian 
immigration advisory group claims that more than 95 percent of its investor-class 
applicants herald from countries or regions that it classifies as ‘low mobility’, such 
as China, Russia, South Asia and the Middle East (Underwood 2015). 
 
4. To reduce taxes. Many IIPs operated by offshore financial centers and tax havens 
specifically target wealthy individuals seeking to avoid tax.  
 
3.2.  What opportunity structures do IIPs create for migrants?  
 
Different IIP wealth and engagement criteria create opportunities for different kinds of 
immigrant investor strategy. Building on our analysis of IIP objectives above, we identify 
four ‘ideal-type’ immigrant investor strategies. To do so we break the ‘wealth’ scale into 
two categories: ‘middling’ wealth programs targeting immigrants with private wealth in 
the single-digit millions, and ‘high’ wealth programs targeting private wealth from the tens 
of millions. High wealth programs may also target advanced levels of human capital (e.g. 
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higher degrees and multi-lingual skills). Similarly, we divide the ‘engagement’ scale into 
‘passive’ IIPs with few residence requirements or investment management 
responsibilities, and ‘active’ IIPs which require deeper commitment to the destination 
country (see Figure 6). 
 
We identify four types of immigrant investor strategy that are likely to emerge from 
different combinations of IIP requirements: 
 
1. IIPs that require middling wealth and passive engagement may enable Aspiring 
Astronaut strategies. Aspiring Astronauts are successful professionals seeking to 
straddle localities so as to access global opportunities and grow their financial and 
human capital— so that they or their children may one day become an ‘Absent 
Oligarch’ or a ‘Migrant Mayor’. 
 
Figure 6: Immigrant investor strategies incentivized by different IIP criteria 
 
 
Meanwhile, the costs and commitments of an IIP constitute a significant outlay, 
which they seek to buy and hold. This category accounted for the lion’s share of 
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IIPs in our study. Depending how borderline cases are categorized, we estimate 
more than a third and possibly as many as half of all the IIPs in our database target 
this type of immigrant investor, even if inadvertently (see Figure 7).  
 
2. IIPs with high wealth but low engagement requirements may incentivize Absent 
Oligarch strategies. Absent Oligarchs are rich elites (and in some cases, fugitives) 
who wish to park wealth and/or family abroad to hedge against political and 
economic risks at home, with little or no regard for the impact of their strategy in 
the destination state. Absent Oligarchs see IIP wealth criteria as minor hurdles, and 
they are attracted by low engagement criteria. The Absent Oligarch category was 
the second-largest of our four: in our assessment it accounted for somewhere 
between a fifth and a third of the IIPs we found (see Figure 7). However, this 
category also probably accounted for many of the loudest complaints about IIPs 
(see below).  
 
3. Pioneer patrons are ultra-wealthy and public-spirited people with both the desire 
and the ability to build a major public legacy in an adopted home. Having achieved 
truly exceptional financial success, they are ready to give back by engaging at the 
highest levels in major public works. We speculate that most IIPs hope to attract 
pioneer patrons, but very few create the right incentives to do so: by our estimation, 
less than one in four of the IIPs we reviewed (and perhaps as few as one in seven) 
put in place the incentives to target this category (see Figure 7).  
 
4. IIPs requiring middling wealth but active engagement may create opportunities for 
Migrant Mayors. Migrant Mayors are successful professionals seeking higher 
levels of financial success and public recognition in an adopted country. IIP wealth 
requirements constitute a significant cost for people in this wealth bracket, but they 
are prepared to meet the engagement requirements and fully invest themselves in 
their new home. In histories of immigrant entrepreneurship in the 19th century and 
before, Pioneer Patrons often cut their teeth as Migrant Mayor types, and so it is 
perhaps surprising that so few IIPs seem to encourage this type of strategy. From 
our analysis, this category accounted for well under a fifth of IIPs reviewed, and 
possibly less than 1 percent, depending how borderline cases are categorized (see 
Figure 7). 
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4. How could IIPs be improved? 
 
In this research we bring to bear a considerable depth of primary expertise on migration 
and migration policy issues (Gamlen), on the Chinese business and investment 
environment (Kutarna), and on Sovereign Development Funds and institutional investors 
more broadly (Monk). That said, our review of IIPs has a number of limitations. We 
collected data on IIPs but not on the migrants who use them. We relied mainly on 
secondary information about IIPs and had limited interaction with policy makers directly 
involved in this specific area. We do not claim to have exhaustively covered the topic—
and indeed, our primary purpose in writing this paper is to stimulate the formation of a 
much-needed research agenda around IIPs. Notwithstanding these caveats, this research 
has put us in a position to comment on the circumstances in which IIPs appear to work 
well, or not. In this section we provide such commentary, first by analyzing the concerns 
that have been documented about IIPs to-date, then by suggesting how IIPs might better 
achieve their objectives of generating wealth and engagement. Finally, we draw insights 
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from the literature on Sovereign Development Funds that may provide guidance to the 
designers of Immigrant Investor Programs as to how the additional financial wealth could 
be put to good use in the local economy.  
 
4.1 What concerns have IIPs raised?  
 
Figure 7 above hints at some of the worries that have been raised by IIPs to-date. In line 
with our broader analysis, we identify two main concerns: poor economic outcomes, and 
poor immigrant engagement.  
 
Concern #1: Poor economic outcomes 
 
As we demonstrate below, IIPs have often been criticized for failing to deliver on their 
hoped-for aim of attracting wealth. We offer two plausible explanations. First, they may 
fail because they are unable to attract immigrants with the right skills. Second, IIPs may 
deliver poor results because they do not set meaningful performance targets.  
 
IIPs aim to attract immigrants with the skills and abilities to make a substantial impact on 
the destination economy. This is an ambitious aim, and it may fail if IIPs attract people 
who lack the requisite attributes. The US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (2015 p.15) has highlighted ‘questions about the benefits of the [EB-5] 
program and whether foreign investors, often disinclined or unable to assess business risks, 
are adding the intended value to the US economy.’ In two other high-level critiques, the 
US Department of Homeland Security reported that the US government ‘cannot 
demonstrate that the [EB-5] program is improving the US economy and creating jobs for 
US citizens’; and a Brookings-Rockefeller research initiative reported that ‘knowledge of 
the program’s true economic impact is elusive at best’ (Elkind and Jones 2014:1). 
 
Part of the issue is that ‘skills’ and ‘abilities’ are notoriously hard to capture in immigrant 
selection criteria: they involve intangible elements (particularly at the high-skill end of the 
spectrum), and labor market demand for them may change faster than policies can adapt. 
IIPs face a magnified version of this problem. The skill of creating wealth involves 
attributes (including talents or networks) that are especially fluid and hard to define—
 21  
otherwise, everybody would be wealthy. So it is not surprising that IIPs have generally 
failed to measure and target accurately the human capital they seek. 
 
These difficulties are leading many conventional immigration programs to shift away from 
‘measuring’ skills and talents through official points systems and towards giving 
employers the responsibility to recruit immigrants with the skills they need (Chaloff and 
Lemaitre, 2009). But for IIPs, this presents a second challenge: most IIPs have not 
identified ‘employers’ capable of vetting and ‘hiring’ entrepreneurs and investors with the 
requisite skills. Perhaps this is because such people are conventionally thought of as ‘self-
employed’—even though, regardless of their legal employment status, investors and 
entrepreneurs often effectively ‘work for’ a bank or some other financial intermediary, 
whose function is to match capital with investment opportunities.  
 
Involving financial firms and institutions in the selection of immigrant investors would be 
an obvious way of bringing IIPs into line with other areas of high-skilled immigrant 
selection, but we did not find evidence of this approach in the IIPs we reviewed.13  Indeed, 
some documented concerns about IIPs explicitly highlighted a discrepancy between IIP 
scrutiny of investor proposals and the scrutiny that would be carried out by financial 
industry professionals. For example, Fortune magazine reported that: 
 
‘because the EB-5 industry is virtually unregulated, it has become a magnet for 
amateurs, pipe-dreamers, and charlatans, who see it as an easy way to score 
funding for ventures that banks would never touch. They’ve been encouraged and 
enabled by an array of dodgy middlemen, eager to cash in on the gold rush. 
Meanwhile, perhaps because wealthy foreigners are the main potential victims, US 
authorities have seemed inattentive to abuses.’  
 
Inefficient use of financial capital is partly a human capital issue—a lack of investment 
nous—but also an issue of overall program design. Remarkably few IIPs specify any clear 
purposes for the funds they generate, a circumstance clearly at odds with other programs 
and policies designed to convert and/or manage sovereign wealth. The few existing 
                                                          
13 Declaration of interest: This project received approximately CAD$10,000 from Dundee Corporation, an 
investment company, which supported three research assistants. 
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attempts to incentivize/dis-incentivize investment in particular regions or sectors have 
proved difficult to monitor and enforce, and most programs simply dissolve private 
investments into the economy in the vague hope that growth will somehow result. This 
lack of clarity over investment objectives also plagues those IIPs whose monies are given 
directly to the government. Programs may be rhetorically justified by the objective of 
raising capital for key sectors or strategies, such as economic transformation or 
infrastructure renewal, but, based on our assessment, such statements of intent seldom 
correspond to any specific fund management strategy. Instead, funds given to the 
government are typically absorbed into the general treasury, where they lose any 
distinctive identity or capacity to be harnessed for a specific objective. 
 
In the absence of clear targets, few IIPs even attempt to measure their results. Those that 
do so often report disappointing impacts on high-level measures of economic growth and 
job creation. In 2015, the US Government Accountability Office slammed the office of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services for failing to put a strategy or system in place to 
assess the EB-5 investor visa program’s economic benefits (despite its legislated mandate 
to create jobs). St Kitts and Nevis’ IIP was one of the few we found publishing regular 
evaluation-friendly data.  In such a vague climate, it is unsurprising that a 2014 report by 
the UK’s Migration Advisory Committee concluded that the country’s Tier 1 Investor Visa 
scheme, launched in 2008, had yielded no demonstrable welfare gains to-date.14 When 
coupled with concerns about the ‘sale of citizenship’, such unclear and unconvincing 
evaluations have often brought experiments with IIPs to an abrupt end.  
 
The IIF model, in which IIP revenues are placed in a distinctive and professionally 
managed institutional investment vehicle, is an exception to this characterization. IIFs 
offer a vehicle through which to mobilize IIP resources in specific and often commercial 
ways. They can thus, if structured properly, be a source of profits for the state and investors 
and enable a more rigorous assessment of outcomes in what would otherwise be a highly 
ambiguous environment of diffuse impacts. In the final section of this paper we expand on 
how IIFs might better do so by adopting insights from the design and performance of 
                                                          
14 As of October 2015, St Kitts and Nevis’ IIF, the Sugar Industry Diversification Foundation, had disbursed 
US$174,231,394. 
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Sovereign Development Funds (SDFs)—another kind of institutional investment vehicle 
that serves a developmental policy objective in addition to a commercial objective. 
 
Concern #2: Poor immigrant engagement  
 
While the economic impact of IIPs is often difficult to perceive, the complaints they 
generate in public discourse often come across clearly to those with the political authority 
to renew or discontinue such programs.  
 
Perhaps the most visceral complaints about IIPs concern perceived changes to the meaning 
of citizenship. Traditionally, the citizen has been a person who is both governed and who 
participates actively in government. IIPs align squarely with the trend in large, open 
Western economies toward economic citizenship, which emphasizes participation in 
commercial and financial markets, rather than participation in the public sphere and civil 
society, as a basis for public recognition and reward. Wealth-based components to 
citizenship are not new. Property ownership has been a criterion for citizenship since 
ancient times, and public-spirited commerce, investment and philanthropy have long been 
the price of public influence. Therefore, the pressing concern about IIPs may not be their 
promotion of economic citizenship per se, but rather that they promote what might be 
thought of as financial citizenship, in which parked wealth buys out the need for any public 
participation, and passive rent-seeking is rewarded over public engagement. Many IIPs 
have reported cases of entrants who drop off the radar and remain disengaged from local 
communities. In 2014, Canada’s then immigration minister, Chris Alexander, echoed these 
concerns, noting that, ‘There is little evidence that immigrant investors, as a class, are 
maintaining ties to Canada’ (Carman and O’Neill 2014). 
 
Certain program design choices may exacerbate public concerns about what we call civic 
buyout. Some programs allow investors to reduce (buy out) their residency requirements 
by committing higher levels of financial capital into the program. For example, by upping 
their capital commitment from US$1 million to US$6.6 million, investor migrants to New 
Zealand can cut their residency obligation from 146 days per year in two out of every three 
years, to just 44 days. Entrants through Australia’s ‘Business Innovation’ and ‘Investor’ 
streams must sign an Australian Values Statement and reside for extended periods, but 
‘Significant’ and ‘Premium’ Investors need not. Similarly, for the UK’s ‘Tier 1 
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Entrepreneur Visa’, the period of residency required prior to obtaining permanent 
residence or citizenship is dependent on the investor’s level of business activity in the 
country. Other programs dis-incentivize immigrant engagement in more subtle ways. In 
Bulgaria, the price of permanent residency is US$3.3 million if directly invested into an 
unlisted Bulgarian company, but only US$560,000 if invested into listed stocks and 
shares—a provision that may rightly discourage fly-by-night start-ups, but may also 
dampen the potential for IIPs to stimulate the small- and medium-enterprise sector (where, 
economists argue, most jobs are created).  
 
Perhaps a more enlightened approach is that of Ireland, whose IIP lowers capital 
requirements for more engaged forms of investment: a two-year residency permit can be 
had for a relatively passive US$2.2 million investment into the Irish bond market, or half 
that—US$1.1 million—for a more active investment into an operating Irish business. Such 
active investment is still a form of economic citizenship, which may always be anathema 
to many people. But in cultivating what might be thought of as entrepreneur citizens—as 
opposed to either worker citizens or financial citizens—perhaps it is economic citizenship 
of a less divisive kind. 
 
Nonetheless, IIPs can evoke strong protests about disdain for the virtues of citizenship 
when politicians sell it for profit and immigrants purchase it for dubious purposes. In 2014 
an Opposition Leader in St Kitts was quoted as saying, ‘We do not see that sufficient 
controls are currently in place to ensure that bad people, for want of better language, do 
not get access to our citizenship’ (McFadden 2013). In 2013, an Austrian politician was 
fined €67,500 for soliciting a contribution from a Russian investor in return for Austrian 
citizenship—an arrangement the former described as ‘part of the game’ (The Economist 
2013). That same year, Montenegro ended its scheme amid controversy for granting 
citizenship to former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who had been charged with 
corruption (ibid). Infamously, Kiribati’s IIP enabled two North Korean businessmen use 
the countries visa-waiver agreements to establish an illegal military factory in Hong Kong 
(Ryall 2012). Similarly, in regional free-movement zones like the EU, when one states 
sells visas it affects all the others, and so in 2014 the head of the EU Parliament’s 
Budgetary Control Committee stated, ‘Citizenship in exchange for money is cynical. This 
has nothing to do with European values, and this practice must be stopped immediately’ 
(Brusa 2014). A former Dominican Attorney General told Associated Press that ‘There 
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could be a flood of people with our passports relocating here. What are we going to do 
then? Really, this program must be halted. It’s dangerous to us and dangerous for our 
neighbors’ (McFadden 2013). 
 
Such statements reveal both anxieties about citizenship and a related foreboding, common 
across many other IIPs, about sovereignty and security issues. In 2011 the BBC reported 
on Latvia’s immigrant investor initiative, highlighting that ‘Many Latvians object to their 
government providing incentives for Russians to buy Latvian assets. And some … believe 
that an influx of Russian investment will increase Moscow's influence in the region’ 
(McGuinness 2011). The Migration Policy Institute’s Madeleine Sumption, meanwhile, 
crystallized concerns emerging from the hyper-securitized US policy context, saying ‘No 
level of scrutiny can completely guarantee that terrorists will not make use of these 
programs’ (McFadden 2013). Albeit on the alarmist side, such documented concerns 
indicate a wider disquiet about IIPs that must be addressed. 
 
Such concerns perhaps reflect the weaknesses of present approaches rather than the failure 
of a general idea. Our wealth-vs-engagement survey of the existing IIP landscape suggests 
that few countries strive to attract high levels of both. Programs that lowball each 
dimension have been plagued by problems, as evidenced by their disestablishment rate. 
Some IIPs have responded to this outcome by increasing the wealth threshold for 
immigrant investors, which raises more cash but also amplifies concerns about Absent 
Oligarchs buying out their civic duties and inflating safe assets. Fewer IIPs have responded 
by increasing their engagement provisions—even though, in our assessment, some of the 
most successful and carefully designed programs are those that do target ‘Pioneer Patrons’, 
i.e., applicants with both high wealth and high willingness to engage with the destination 
economy and society. From this perspective, the key question becomes: how can IIPs be 
re-thought and re-designed to spur greater levels of economically active public 
engagement?   
 
4.2 How should the capital attracted by Immigrant Investor Programs be governed? 
 
A key aspect of this re-think is to improve the utilization of the human and financial capital 
that IIPs bring in—to design a higher thresholds for economic citizenship into programs 
themselves, rather than hope that investor immigrants will cross it on their own. 
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Based on the capital management models we reviewed (see pp. 6-7), by our reckoning IIPs 
have the best chance of achieving their twin objectives of attracting wealth and cultivating 
engagement when these programs are paired with some form of Immigrant Investment 
Fund (IIF). Immigrant Investment Funds are an inconsistently-practiced capital 
management model at present, but a promising one. Whereas most IIPs diffuse program 
revenues into either the general economy or the state’s general revenues, IIFs offer the 
possibility of a third alternative: a government-owned or -overseen investment vehicle that 
receives immigrant investors’ capital contributions and manages them according to both 
for-profit, commercial objectives and developmental objectives whose clear public 
benefits can be traced back to the IIP itself—and thus, back to immigrant investors.  
 
An IIF may appear to be a unique investment vehicle, in large part thanks to its unique 
source of investable assets (via IIPs), but we would label IIFs as a new type of sovereign 
wealth fund and, more specifically, as a form of sovereign development fund (SDF). 
Sovereign funds are quite different from other investment organizations, such as pension 
funds or endowments. The latter, due to the direct liabilities they owe to those who 
contribute funds, are bound by fiduciary duty to focus exclusively on providing them with 
a return on their investment. Sovereign funds, by contrast, owe no specific liabilities to 
individuals or organizations outside of the government. The wealth belongs to the 
sovereign. Likewise, an IIF would seem to have no specific liabilities to individuals or 
organizations outside of the government, as its wealth comes in the form of non-returnable 
fees (i.e., risk capital) contributed by immigrant investors.  
 
The lack of direct liabilities frees sovereign wealth funds to take on strategic objectives as 
part of their investment function (Clark et al 2013), at which point they may be more 
accurately termed sovereign development funds (Monk 2009). The world’s existing SDFs 
tend to be strategic, government-sponsored investment organizations that have dual 
objective functions: to deliver competitive investment returns while fostering extra-
financial goals, such as job creation, infrastructure development or economic growth (i.e., 
‘development’). The best SDFs drive positive development outcomes by leveraging the 
capitalist system. Their competitive financial performance attracts the participation of 
private capital, which multiplies the development activity the SDF can generate. The result 
is the growth of socially valuable industries. For successful SDFs, high private returns on 
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investment and strong, explicit public benefits are not conflicting goals; the former is a 
key input that helps drive the latter (Clark and Monk 2015).  
 
In our view, given IIPs’ dual objectives of attracting wealth and engaging immigrants, 
governments considering the launch or redesign of an IIP should evaluate IIFs as part of 
the policy package. When doing so, they should consider IIFs as a new kind of SDF that 
simply has a unique funding source. Doing so would allow governments to draw important 
lessons from the accumulating global pool of SDF experiences. For example, it is now 
understood that outperforming SDFs often have access to local and unique knowledge 
bases to drive their investment decision-making (Clark and Monk 2015). We therefore 
envisage that a well-designed and -governed IIF would tie the investment vehicle and its 
investment strategy not only to the IIP’s objectives, but to the immigrant investor 
community itself—drawing on their global networks and investing in their local activities. 
Mining the networks and knowledge contained within the IIP’s immigrant community can 
yield profitable investment opportunities, attract additional private funds to multiply the 
IIF’s public impact, and yield a more sustained economic engagement between investor 
migrants and their destination country—all core IIP public policy objectives.  
 
Our review of the current landscape identified about a half-dozen IIPs that operate vehicles 
akin to IIFs, but which are incomplete for either of two reasons. Some fail to pursue a 
financial bottom line—which can bring rigor, professionalism and indeed measurement—
and instead simply disburse the program monies they control as grants. They are, in 
essence, ‘sovereign spending funds’. Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts 
and Nevis, and Malta operate vehicles that fall into this category. Others fail to link the 
IIP monies they receive to a clearly demonstrable public-good outcome. They become 
fully for-profit vehicles, and they thereby obscure any concrete connection between 
migrants’ economic investment and their public contribution. Australia, the Netherlands 
and Singapore might be considered in this category: they all offer migrants the option to 
put their capital contribution into one of a number of government-approved, but privately-
run, venture capital funds.  
 
The one example we found of an IIF that passes this critique and does explicitly pursue 
both commercial and developmental objectives is the British Columbia Immigrant 
Investment Fund, originally set up to invest the Province’s share of funds received through 
 28  
Canada’s previous Immigrant Investor Program. The BCIIF is organized as a state-owned 
corporation with a government-appointed, private sector board of directors. Its financial 
objective—‘to maximize the financial returns from the funds invested’—is an explicit part 
of its mission and values, and its development objective is also clear, albeit very broad: 
‘job creation and economic growth in British Columbia’. However, the BCIIF departs 
from the ideal IIF in other ways. The wealth it controls is not fully ‘sovereign’; under 
Canada’s previous IIP, an investor migrant’s US$300,000 (later, $600,000) deposit was 
fully guaranteed and had to be returned to the migrant after five years. Partly as a result of 
this liability, the BCIIF must invest a portion of its funds into short-term money markets 
and vanilla debt instruments in order to honor its repayment obligations. 
 
In a manner of speaking, IIFs in 2015 exist in a ‘pre-principle’ era, similar to sovereign 
funds in 2007. At that time, sovereign funds were barely a topic of policy-making, and 
there were as yet no generalizable standards of governance or management to be found. In 
2008, however, the sovereign fund community came together and promulgated a set of 
principles (called the ‘Santiago Principles’) intended to help all governments establish 
successful sovereign funds. Today’s IIP and IIF policy makers, we believe, could benefit 
from a similar set of principles and policies. As such, drawing on Clark and Monk’s (2015) 
research on SDFs, we propose a set of principles derived from the lessons learned to-date. 
While not prescriptive, we do want to endow governments with a broad organizational and 
operational blueprint that can lay the foundations for a successful IIF: 
 
Principles for successful public-good performance: 
1. Coherence: IIF objectives should be aligned, such that high financial 
performance coheres with successfully obtaining extra-financial 
objectives. 
 
2. Oversight: The sponsor should seek to imbue the IIF with world-class 
governance, which generally demands a small group (seven to nine 
members) of sophisticated investment or business professionals. 
 
3. Delegation: The IIF will operate in complex, local environments that 
demand independence of operation. There should be a clear separation of 
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powers between government and the fund, and between the board and 
management team.  
 
4. Accountability: At the same time, boards should be accountable to their 
government sponsor in accordance with the IIF’s mandate, just as senior 
executives should be accountable to their boards of directors. 
 
Principles for successful financial performance: 
 
5. Measurement: An IIF should always have a financial rate of return target. 
This signals a risk tolerance to the management team and gives 
stakeholders an expected long-term performance benchmark with which to 
hold management accountable. The time horizon for this target should be 
long-term, but intermediate hurdles should be set and met as well.  
 
6. Commerciality: An IIF should have a well-defined, commercial 
orientation that can guide management and decision-making, as well as 
help other investors understand and appreciate its mission. The art in 
designing a successful IIF will inevitably be in selecting the capitalist 
activities that can achieve the specified public policy objectives.  
 
7. Marketability: One test of an effective investment strategy is whether 
other market participants might view it as attractive enough to join the IIF 
in specific projects and/or investments. An IIF should evolve from being a 
market catalyst into being a ‘market maker’.    
 
Principles for recognizing and realizing the IIF’s dual public-private nature: 
 
8. Positioning: An IIF may be asked to catalyze ecosystems rather than 
specific companies. This means having the flexibility to do single deals that 
may seem unwise in isolation, but which in the context of a broader strategy 
generate considerable upside. It is thus important that the IIF be positioned 
to participate in the upside of specific companies as an ecosystem matures. 
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In short, it should be attuned to the commercial activities emerging from 
the IIP and IIP migrant networks, and be positioned to participate.   
 
9. Capabilities: An IIF’s investment performance will often be predicated on 
unrivalled knowledge of local markets and opportunities. As such, the IIF 
will have to be able to source, assess, structure, and de-risk (as appropriate) 
investment opportunities, which means it has to be able to attract and retain 
quality people.   
 
10. Phasing: An IIF will inevitably operate in immature and private markets, 
which means it will have to navigate higher levels of illiquidity. A well-run 
IIF will develop a strategy of phasing in investments over time so as to 
ensure capital is deployed into only the most promising investments, 
recognizing that it can be difficult to assess that at the beginning of an 
investment.   
 
11. Risk: An IIF will face idiosyncratic, project-specific risks rather than the 
generic market risks faced by traditional investors. It is thus important that 
the IIF recognize the nature and scope of risks in its projects and plan 
accordingly, drawing on scenario planning, agent-based models and other 
qualitative factors. 
 
12. Translation: An IIF can serve as an important and valuable point of contact 
for investor communities that are in some way connected to the immigrants 
or to geographies that the immigrants represent. Because of the government 
connection, the IIF will be in a position to help foreign investors 
communicate with local governments, not least to help governments 
understand the investment needs and opportunities they bring.  
 
The above principles and policies, drawn from our research on SDFs, should inform the 
design of IIFs. Such a blueprint could be invaluable to policymakers—and thus, to the 
local communities who may ultimately benefit from the investing and development 
activity of a well-run IIF. Conceiving the management of IIP human and financial capital 
inflows in this way suggests the possibility of a virtuous cycle of immigration, investment 
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and growth. Thus far, this possibility has eluded IIP policy implementations. But the SDF 
experience proves that a virtuous circle can be achieved in other domains of sovereign 
wealth management through sound design, strong governance and sophisticated 




Immigrant Investor Programs are a site of vibrant policy experimentation and growth. The 
present proliferation of these programs should come as no surprise, given their promise to 
advance two urgent and important public policy objectives: attracting new financial and 
human capital to support government budgets and developmental agendas, and cultivating 
economically engaged citizen-entrepreneurs who can drive economic growth and 
innovation. As we noted in the introduction, similar objectives have motivated analogous 
policies for centuries. But just like these historical precursors, IIPs raise deep conceptual 
and practical issues that urgently need rethinking, weighing concerns about citizenship, 
sovereignty and security, against enthusiasm about potential new sources of economic 
dynamism and publicly engaged investment.  
 




We observe that much IIP experimentation to-date has targeted varying levels of 
immigrant investor wealth, and consistently low levels of immigrant investor engagement. 
We also observe that popular and durable IIPs have targeted high levels of both wealth 
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and engagement, and that other significant IIPs have been moving in this direction over 
time. 
 
The challenge is how to conceptualize and design IIPs to achieve these twin objectives. 
Our review of the emerging IIP universe shows that models and best practices remain 
elusive. This, too, is no surprise, given the complexity of the policy environment (see 
Figure 8). Underlying the design and administration of IIPs are two separate domains of 
expertise, immigration policy and financial management. These domains operate with very 
different conceptual language, frameworks and patterns of practice, and the overall success 
or failure of the program depends upon their close coordination and consistency with each 
other.  
 
Their work is further complicated by a variety of constraints: political constraints set by 
prevailing public discourses and attitudes toward what we call passive ‘financial 
citizenship’; risk constraints, specifically threats to public security and sovereignty, and of 
fraud; and competitive constraints, determined by the eligibility criteria set by programs 
for similar destinations. The latter is a constant reminder to policymakers that the financial 
and human capital resources they seek to attract and engage via IIPs are embodied in 
individuals and households that bear their own interests and agendas. Program participants 
see IIPs as opportunity structures, and they develop strategies to satisfy policy makers’ 
eligibility criteria without compromising their own lifestyle and wealth management 
objectives. The interplay of the above policy inputs and environmental constraints yields 
a range of policy approaches and outcomes, and this paper has taken the first steps toward 
mapping them out.  
 
We have also identified ways in which IIPs can better position themselves for success, 
specifically in the objectives around development and catalyzing local economic activity. 
We hypothesize that the establishment of well-designed and governed Immigrant 
Investment Funds to separately manage the proceeds of these programs, as an alternative 
to scattering them into either the general public purse or broad economy, would improve 
the chances of IIP success. Indeed, recent research into Sovereign Development Funds 
strongly suggests that the establishment of IIFs can facilitate a variety of policy 
improvements: the codification of more specific and measurable ‘double bottom line’ 
financial and public policy objectives; the involvement of investment professionals in the 
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recruitment of immigrants possessing genuine investment skill, akin to the private sector’s 
involvement in recruiting other highly-skilled foreign workers; better economic 
engagement of investor-migrants, via participation in the administration of fund 
investments and/or the identification of investment opportunities in their origin markets; 
and better transparency regarding the public benefits that accrue from the IIP’s conversion 
of the country's destination appeal into tangible human and financial capital.  
 
Most importantly, we have identified the urgent need for further research to better 
understand this mushrooming policy phenomenon. Beyond the manifest challenges of 
managing incoming program revenues and integrating incoming investor migrants, IIPs 
confront policy makers and their publics with one of the most profound normative 
questions in all politics: What is the meaning of citizenship? Do IIPs represent a 
fundamental shift in emphasis from civic to economic duties of membership in society, 
and what are the implications of that shift? Equally vital is to better understand the 
journeys of investor migrants themselves. Do IIPs treat them as ‘cash cows’, valued 
instrumentally for their wealth rather than intrinsically as human beings (Harrison 1996). 
Can IIPs dignify ‘investment’ as a sought-after skill and genuinely engage the migrants 
who possess it, or do the opportunity structures created by IIPs instead lock them into a 
purely transactional relationship with the destination society? There is much rhetoric, but 
little data, on how varying IIP criteria and administration can impact the entrepreneurial 
resources that investor migrants bring to bear, as well as their social and cultural 
adaptation, in the destination country.  
 
To finance scholars and practitioners, IIPs invite a bold rethink of the concept of 
‘sovereign wealth’ to recognize a wider array of latent stores of value—like destination 
appeal. Recognizing these unconventional forms, their convertibility into human and 
financial capital, and the strong economic incentives to do so, raises profound, urgent 
questions: should these latent stores of value be converted into ready capital? Can they be 
depleted, like other forms of sovereign wealth, and if so, what would that depletion look 
like? How should they be governed and managed, once converted? How applicable are the 
lessons learned from conventional sovereign wealth management, or do these 
unconventional forms demand distinctive stewardship models and approaches? The 
present scale of Immigrant Investor Programs means that finding good answers to the 
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above questions may directly impact tens of thousands of migrant journeys, and billions 
of dollars in cross-border capital movements and public investment, each year.  
 
Moreover, on the practical front we see potential for IIFs to help address today’s global 
crises surrounding refugees and migration. First consider the historical example of the 
‘Nansen Stamp Fund’, which was seeded by the sale of humanitarian visas to refugees 
after the Russian Revolution of 1917 (Long 2013). These visas gave refugees freedom to 
seek work instead of languishing in camps and queuing for quotas. Meanwhile, the fund 
generated by the visa fees made refugees self-supporting, which staved off host-country 
fears that they might become an economic burden. Today we would call the Nansen Stamp 
Fund a kind of IIF, and indeed we suggest that IIFs may be a key to the idea of reviving 
the Nansen System, which has recently been proposed (Long 2015; Betts 2015). The 
Nansen Fund failed to demonstrate that refugees may create jobs rather than steal them, 
and so the visa system collapsed under rising unemployment and related anti-immigrant 
sentiment during the Great Depression. But a modern IIF need not suffer the same fate.  
 
Drawing lessons from other types of Sovereign Development Funds, modern IIFs could 
incubate start-ups led by and for refugees, pursuing commercial objectives as well as 
facilitating refugee and immigrant integration. Norway is already using a Sovereign 
Development Fund to invest in an increased refugee intake (The Local 2015), in the 
knowledge that within five to ten years the economic benefits of this intake will outweigh 
the costs (Connolly 2015). Meanwhile, IIFs that focus on infrastructure investment could 
help build the refugee-hosting capacity of states closest to conflicts, thereby ‘enhancing 
the protection space’ afforded to refugees. And by helping to stimulate infrastructure 
growth and other public goods in destination countries farther afield, such IIFs could 
demonstrate, unequivocally, the development contribution made by immigrants and 
refugees. In this way IIFs might help flip the anti-immigrant narrative that is dangerously 
poisoning politics in many countries (Zamora-Kapoor and Verea, 2014). These are but a 
few examples of how IIFs might today be put to good use—we hope to explore many 
more.  
 
Did the pro-aristocracy Duke of Saint-Simon end up on the wrong side of history? Perhaps 
it is too soon to say yes or no. Despite his vociferous warnings, the admission of the ‘vile 
bourgeoisie’ into the nobility did not wreck France—although it may have been one of the 
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many domestic factors behind the French Revolution, which began 34 years after his death. 
If Immigrant Investment Funds can bring about evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
change in the way immigration and investment serve the public good, we see them as an 
exciting new development worthy of further conceptual and practical development. Either 
way, the rise of Immigrant Investment Funds and their implications for 21st century 
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Wealth Requirements Engagement Requirements 








Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
Economic self-sufficiency required. 
Residence Without Gainful Activity: €400,000 
(US$438,000) in assets. 
Residence for Professional with International Client Base: 
€50,000 (US$55,000) deposit with Andorran National 
Finance Institute plus €10,000 (US$11,000) for each 
dependant.  
Residence for Recognised Sports Cultural or Scientific 
Talent: €50,000 (US$55,000) deposit with Andorran 





Residence for Professional with International Client Base: 
Operational base in Andorra with a maximum of one 
employee. Must demonstrate international dealings and 
business coherence. 
Residence for Recognised Sports Cultural or Scientific 
Talent: International recognition in one's field (sports, 
culture, science). 
 
Must reside in country 90 days 















US$250,000 donation to National Development Fund; or 
US$400,000 Real Estate held for 5 years; or US$1.5 million 
business investment. 
 
Reside in country 5 days in first 
5 years to renew passport. 
Australia1         Entrepreneurial 
Migration Visa 
1976-1981 3 year 
residency. 
Risk Capital Financial and/or Human Capital:  
No minimum amount of investment capital set, but in 
practice at least AU$200,000 (US$143,000) required. 
Investors needed detailed business proposals. Changed to 
Business Migration Programme in 1981 
 




1981-1991 3 year 
residency. 
Risk Capital Financial and/or Human Capital:  
Assets worth (AU$300,000 and AU$850,000) (US$ 15,200 
and US$609,000). Must be transferrable to Australia. Must 













Intend to permanently settle 









1991-2012 3 year 
residency. 
Risk Capital Financial and/or Human Capital: 
  
AU$200,000 assets (US$143,000) and 10percent ownership 
of public company. Minimum AU$10,000 (US$7,100) to 
settle. Professional, technical or trade services do not 
qualify. Must demonstrate knowledge of English and be 
under age 45. Replaced by Business Innovation and 
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Financial Capital:  
 
Business Innovation Stream: Ownership interest in business 
with AU$500,000 (US$358,000) annual turnover in past 4 
years. Individual or partner must have AU$800,000 
(US$573,000) in transferrable assets available. 
Investor Stream: Invest AU$1.5 million (US$107 million) in 
state or territory government security. Directly manage 
investments worth AU$1.5 million or have 10percent 
ownership interest in qualifying business and have acquired 
AU$2.25m (US$1.6 million) in previous 2 years 
(transferable to Australia). 
Significant Investor Stream: AU$5 million (US$ 3.6 
million) held over 4 years of which at least AU$500,000 
(US$358,000) in venture capital or growth private equity 
fund and AU$1.5 million (US$107 million) in eligible funds 
investing in emerging companies. 
Premium Investor: AU$25 million (US$17.9 million) in 
Australian securities exchange listed assets, approved bonds 
or notes, Australian proprietary limited companies, real 
property in Australia, deferred annuities issued by 
Australian registered life companies, state or approved 
philanthropic contribution. Individual and partner must have 
assets of AU15 million (US$10.7 million). Residential real 




Significant Investor Stream and Premium Investor: Good 
health 
Business Innovation: Good health and under age 55 (can be 
waived). Must score over 65 on Points Based System and 
have successful business career.  
Investor Stream: as above and minimum three years’ 
experience direct involvement managing successful 







Business Innovation Stream: 
Good character. Sign 
Australian Values Statement. 
Must be nominated by state or 
territory government. Desire to 
continue own and manage 
business in Australia. 
 
Investor Stream: Good 
character. Sign Australian 
Values Statement. Must live in 
state of investment for 2 years. 
Direct investment in residential 
real estate prohibited. Must 
have commitment to 
continuing investment in 
Australia. 
 
Significant Investor Stream 
Visa: Good character. Continue 
investment after conclusion of 
Visa. Reside in Australia 40 
days per year (or spouse resides 
180 days). 
 
Premium Investor: Good 
character. Continue investment 
after conclusion of Visa. 
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Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
Significant Business History Stream: Net business and 
personal assets of at least AU$1.5 million (US$1.07 million) 
and annual business turnover of at least AU$3 million 
(US$214 million).  
Venture Capital Entrepreneur stream: At least AU$1 million 
(US$700,000) in venture capital funding for the purpose of 
the commercialisation and development of a high-value 




Must be under age 55 (can be waived) and of good health. 
All: Good character. 
Nominated by a state or 
territory government agency 
and invited to apply by the 
minister. Establish or 
participate in a qualifying 
business. 
 
Significant Business History 
Stream: Maintain substantial 
ownership, direct and 
continuous involvement in the 
day-to-day management of the 
business, make decisions that 
affect the overall direction and 
performance of the business in 
a way that benefits the 
Australian economy.  
 
Venture Capital Entrepreneur 
Stream: Must meet the 
requirements of venture capital 
agreement. Must have a 
genuine and realistic 
commitment to continuously 
maintain an ownership interest 
and engagement in business 












€2 million (US$2.2 million) donation into Austrian 
economy/charity or US$10 million recoverable minimum 
investment in Austria.  
 
Engage and invest in the 
Austrian economy through 
joint venture or a direct 
investment in a business 
creating jobs (or bring new 
research or science) 









Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
US$250,000/ $500,000 in residential real estate.  
Intend to reside permanently. 
Employment not permitted for 
US$250,000 investor visa 
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Belize  Citizenship by 
Investment 
1998-2002 Residency Fee Financial Capital: 
  
Non-refundable fee of US$25,000 to be paid into Belize 
Economic Citizenship Investment Fund. US$5,000 
registration fee for each additional, qualifying individual. 
US$15,000 for those under 18. 
 
Must be fully conversant with 
the requirements, criteria, 
guidelines, regulations, laws 
etc. pertaining to the Economic 
Citizenship Investment 
Programme. Must maintain a 
local agent and office in Belize 
(if a non-Belizean). 







after 5 years. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
Investment of BGN 1 million (US$560,000) or have 
increased investments by such amount through acquisition 
of Bulgarian shares, Bulgarian concession agreements or 
securities/rights provided by law, invest BGN 6 million 
(US$3.3 million) of capital in Bulgarian company not listed 
on Bulgarian stock exchange. 
 
Must have acquired rights to 





1978    
Expanded in 









CA$400,000 (US$300,000) investment in Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (increased to CA$800,000 
(US$600,000) in 2010) guaranteed recoverable by the 










Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
CA$2 million (US$1.5 million) investment held over 15 
years in Immigrant Investor Venture Capital fund and 
personal net worth of CA$10 million (US$7.6 million). 
 
Human Capital:  
Must have completed postsecondary degree, diploma or 
certificate of at least 1 year and proficiency in English or 
French. 
 
Reside in country for 2 years 
during 5 year period, not in 
Québec. 













after 3 years. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
Investor Program: Invest CA$800,000  (US$600,000) in 
authorised financial intermediary and individual or partner 
must have CA$1.6 million (US$1.2 million) of assets.  
Entrepreneur Program: CA$300,000 (US$228,000) of net 
assets and carry out or acquire a business with CA$100,000 
(US$76,000) in Québec (with 25percent control of equity). 
Self Employed Programme: Have CA$100,000 












Investor Program: Experience in management in a legal 
farming, commercial or industrial business, or in a legal 
professional business where the staff, excluding the 
investor, occupies at least the equivalent of two full-time 
jobs, or for an international agency or a government or one 
of its departments or agencies. 
Entrepreneur Program: Age, language skills and knowledge 
of Québec influence application. Must have two years’ 
experience in managing the business in question. 
Self Employed Programme: Age, language skills and 
knowledge of Québec influence application. Must have two 
years of experience as a self-employed worker in the 
profession or trade to be practised. 
 
Investor Program: Intend to 
settle in Québec. 
 
Self Employed Programme: 
Individual must come to 
Québec create own job. 







the right to 
work 
2003 25 year 
residency. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
Investor Residency: Income of CI$120,000 (US$146,000) 
without the need to be employed. CI$500,000 (US$600,000) 
in Grand Cayman (at least CI$250,000 (US$305,000) in 
developed residential real estate). Must be economically 
self-sufficient. 
Investor Residency with the right to work: CI$1.6 million 
(US$1.9 million) in developed real estate or personal net 
worth over CI$6million (US$7.3 million) plus CI$1 million 
(US$1.2 million) in an employment generating business. 







Employment not permitted. 
 
Investor Residency with the 
right to work:  Good character. 





after 2 years if 
no legal 
issues. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
US$200,000 in real estate, registrable goods, shares, stocks, 
productive projects or projects of national interest. 
Must reside in country six 
months per year. 
Cannot be hired as an 
employee.  
Curacao Investor Permit 2014 ANG 
500,000: 3 












Investment of ANG 500,000 (US$282,000)  ANG 750,000 
(US$423,000) or ANG 1.5 million (US$84,000). 
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Cyprus  Citizenship by 
Investment 





€5 million (US$5.4 million) bank deposit; or €5 million 
investment in Cypriot real estate, land development, 
infrastructure projects, Cypriot business, financial assets or 
companies that have undertaken a public project; or €1.5 
million (US$1.6 million) revenue over 3 years from Cypriot 
business; or €1.05 million (US$1.14 million) investment in 
business that employs 5 Cypriot citizens - reduced to 
€800,000 (US $875,000) for 10 employees. Individuals 
whose deposits with the Bank of Cyprus or Cyprus Popular 
Bank suffered a loss of at least €3 million (US$3.2 million) 
due to the resolution of 15th March 2013 are also eligible. 




Dominica  Citizenship by 
Investment 




US$100,000 non-refundable contribution to Government 
fund; or US$200,000 investment in real estate to be held 
over 3 years. Requirement increases according to number of 
dependents. 
 
Have a local licensed 
promoting agent (provided by 
Offshore Advisor). 
Estonia  Article 10 
Citizenship Act 
1995 1 year 
renewable 
residency. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
€65,000 (US$71,000) shares in Estonian company; or 
€16,000 (US$17,000) into company as sole proprietor. 
 
Actively perform managerial or 
supervisory functions without 
receiving any remuneration for 
such work. 





Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
3 year permit: approved investment of less than F $500,000 
(US$232,000). 
7 year permit: F $500,000 (US$232,000) plus an approved 
business trade or undertaking.  
 
Must not behave in any manner 
prejudicial to peace, good 
order, good government or 
morals. 
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Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
Exceptional Economic Contribution Visa: €10 million 
(US$10.9 million) long-term and non-speculative 
investment in industrial or commercial assets in France. 
Skills and Talents Temporary Residence Permit: Involved in 
project which can generate assets of €300,000 
(US$328,000), or create/protect 2 jobs; or be involved in a 
project which is led by foreign company and already 




Skills and Talents Temporary Residence Permit: Education 
to degree level. 
Exceptional Economic 
Contribution Visa: To renew 
residency immigrant must meet 
conditions of creating/saving at 
least 50 jobs, and/or 
maintaining investment. 
 
Skills and Talents Temporary 
Residence Permit: Applicants 
must be able to present a 
project that contributes to the 
economic development and 
outreach of France and their 
country of origin as well as 
establishing their ability to 







Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
€1 million (US$1.09 million) investment in German project 




To acquire permanent residency after 3 years individual 
must have sufficient knowledge of German language and 
culture. 
 
To acquire permanent 
residency after 3 years, 
individual must have held 
residency for five years. 













Available funds of £2 million (US$3.1 million). Must own 
residential property in Gibraltar. Must be economically self-
sufficient. 
 
Residency in Gibraltar in 36 
months prior to application not 
permitted. Must have private 
medical insurance. 









Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
€250,000 (US$273,000) investment in property in Greece; 
or if residence permit is needed for an investment plan. 
Employment not permitted. 
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Grenada  Citizenship by 
Investment 
Program 
1994-2001 Citizenship Fee Financial Capital: 
 
US$50,000 into the economy for a family of five (plus 
US$15,000 for each extra child). 
 
 
Grenada  Citizenship by 
Investment 
Program 




US$350,000 in approved real estate project (4 year holding 
period) or US$200,000 donation to Island Transformation 
Fund. 
 
Donation option involves 
holding permanent residency 













Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
Immigration for businessmen: £200,000 (US$310,000) 
available to invest. 
Investor Visa: Invest £1 million (US$1.5 million) in 
Guernsey and maintain investment of £750,000 (US$1.1 
million) 





Businessmen and Investor Visa: Knowledge of English.       
Artist, Writer and Composer Visa: Knowledge of English 
plus valid entry clearance as a writer, composer or artist. 
 
Businessmen Visa: Intend to 
manage a business in 
Guernsey. Employment 
restricted to own business. 
Approved business plan from 
immigration Department of 
which investor will hold 
50percent interest. 
 








2003-2015 Residency Recoverable 
Deposit 
Financial and/or Human Capital: 
  
HK$10 million (US$1.3 million) invested in permissible 
investment asset classes within six months of application or 

























Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
No minimum investment stated but financial assets must be 





Immigrant must have a first degree or technical 












Hungary  Investment 
Immigration 
Program 











€250,000 investment (US$260,000) in government bonds 









Ireland  Immigrant 
Investor 
Programme  















€2 Million (US$2.2 million) investment bond for 5 years; or 
€1 Million (US$1.1 million) investment in Irish enterprises 
for 3 years, or €1 Million (US$1.1 million) investment in 
rental property, or €500,000 (US$547,000) philanthropic 
donation. 
Intend to reside in Ireland or 
demonstrate clear benefit for 
Ireland. Must have private 
medical insurance.   
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2001 3 year 
residency, 
citizenship 
after 5 years. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
Entrepreneur Visa: Business plan to establish, join, or take-
over business in Isle of Man with at least £200,000 
(US$300,000).  




Entrepreneur and Investor Visa: Score over 75 on Points 
Based System (including language requirements).  
Artist, Writer and Composer Visa: Score over 75 on Points 














All visas: No use of public 
funds. 
Investor Visa: Reside in 
country continuously for 5 
years.   
Artist, Writer and Composer 
Visa: Intend to work as a writer, 
composer or artist.  





2015 1 or 3 year 
residency 
permit. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
Investor Business Manager Visa: ¥5 million (US$41,000) in 
new or existing business or business with more than two 
full-time employees who are Japanese or legal residents. 
Business Manager Visa: ¥5 million (US$41,000) in business 
in Japan with one full-time employee who is Japanese or 
legal resident. Must have business plan and secured office 























Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
Businessmen Visa: Intend to open, join or take over a 
business in Jersey with approval from Economic 
Development Minister. Employment restricted to own 
business. 
Investor Visa: Invest £1 million (US$1.5 million) in Jersey 
and maintain investment of £750,000 (US$1.1 million) 





All visas:  Knowledge of English. 
Businessmen visa: Approved business plan from 
Immigration Department of which investor will hold 
50percent interest. 
Artist, Writer and Composer Visa: Valid entry clearance as 







Investor Visa: Main residence 
in Jersey. 
 
Artist, Writer and Composer 
Visa: Intend to work as a writer, 
























Pay US$15,000 to government and US$5,000 deposit. 
Good character. Respect laws, 
customs and traditions of 
Kiribati. Investor must present 
themselves in country and 
report to the Minister of 
Immigration on the progress of 
the investment programme 14 
days prior the expiration of 
investor passport. 




 F5 Visa 2012 Temporary 
residency. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
US$500,000 invested in line with Foreign Investor 
Promotion Law and which hires 5 Koreans; or ownership of 
stocks/shares; or donation according to Foreign Investor 










Latvia  Immigrant 
Investment 
Visa 
















€300,000 (US$328,000) bank deposit for five years; or 
€250,000 (US$273,000) worth of real estate in major 
Latvian cities; or €70,000 (US$76,000) business investment 
upon invitation.  
 
Malaysia1  Silver Haired 
Programme 
1987-2006 5 year 
residency. 
Other Financial Capital: 
  
RM200,000 (US$46,000); or a retirement pension of 
RM5,000 (US$1,100) per month. 
2004 Revision: Retirement Pension with a spouse, 
RM10,000 (US$2,300) a month, (RM7,000 (US$1,600) 
without a spouse); or savings with a spouse of RM150,000 




Must be over 55 years old (only open to Japanese and 
Western European nationals) 
2004 revision: Must be over 50 years.  
 
Employment not permitted. 
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Malaysia2 Malaysia My 
Second Home 
2006 10 year social 







Valid medical insurance required. 
Applicants aged below 50 years: Liquid assets worth a 
minimum of RM500,000 (US$110,000) and offshore 
income of RM10,000 (US$2,300) per month.  
Applicants aged 50 and above: RM350,000 (US$82,000  in 
liquid assets and offshore income of RM10,000 (US$2,300) 
per month.   
Pensioners: Proof of receiving pension from government 
worth RM10,000 (US$2,300) per month. Fixed deposit 
requirement is less for those that have purchased property 







Employment not permitted. 
Those 50 years and above with 
specialized skills and expertise 
in critical sectors of the 
economy are allowed to work 
20 hours per week. MM2H 
holders are not allowed to 
participate in activities that can 
be considered as sensitive to 
local people and as threat to the 
security of the country.  
Malta  Individual 
Investor 
Program 




€350,000 (US$380,000) real estate investment held over 5 
years; or lease property for 5 years at €16,000(US$17,000) 
per annum as well as contributing to National Development 
and Social Fund and investing €150,000 (US$164,000) in 








Resident in Malta in 12 
preceding months to 
application. Must have 
minimum €50,000 Global 










Revised 1989: US$250,000 investment. Buyers prohibited 
from buying or owning land in the Marshalls. 
Revised 1993: US$33,000 bond held over 25 years. 
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Permit: 3 year 
renewable 
residency. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
Permanent Residence Permit: US$500,000 in qualifying 
investment or resident with company turnover of MUR 15 
million (US$417,000) annually. MUR 150,000 
(US$41,000) monthly salary for professionals for 3 years. 
MUR 3 million income (US$83,000) for Self-Employed 
individuals for 3 years. Retirees must transfer USD$40,000 
into Mauritius for 3 years.  
Occupation Permit: Business activity with MUR 4 million 
(US$110,000) annual turnover; or salary exceeding MUR 
45,000 (US$1200) annually (MUR 30,000 for ICT) 
(US$800); or business activity exceeding MUR 600,000 
(US$16,000) for self-employed individuals. 
Retiree Residence Permit: Deposit US$120,000 over 3 years 




Retiree Residence Permit: Must be over age 50.  
 
Permanent Residence Permit: 
Must have held an Occupation 
Permit for 3 years prior (unless 
contributing US$500,000+ in 
qualifying investment). Cannot 
own more than one apartment 
(their personal residence). 
 
Retiree Residence Permit: 
Reside in country 183 days per 
annum. Employment not 
permitted. 












Financial Capital:  
 
€1 million (US$1.2 million): €500,000 deposited in a 
Monaco bank; €500,000 to purchase property worth 
€500,000. 
Must have resided 
continuously in Monaco for 10 
years. Qualifying family 
members must have resided in 
Monaco 6 months per year. 
Must renounce previous 
nationality. 
Montenegro Article 12 
Citizenship Act 
2008-2012 Residency. Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
€500,000 (US$550,000) investment in real estate or 
business in Montenegro. 
 
 
Nauru Citizenship by 
Investment 
Passport 
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Netherlands  Wealthy 
Foreign 
National Visa 








Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
€1.25 million (US$1.4 million) in an innovative company; a 
contractual joint venture that invests in one or more 
innovative companies; a venture fund recognised by the 
Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, or a venture capital 
fund affiliated to the Nederlandse Vereniging van 
Participatiemaatschappijen (NVP). 
 
Must pass Civic Integration test 























Investor Visa: Invest NZ$1.5 million (US$1 million) to be 
held over 5 years in either government bonds; equity in 
public or private NZ firms; or new residential property 
development.  
Investor Plus: NZ$10 million (US$6.6 million) to be held 
over 5 years in either government bonds; equity in public or 




Investor Visa: Must have minimum 3 years business 
experience be under age 65 and demonstrate English 
proficiency. 
 
Investor Visa: Must reside in 
NZ 146 days in 3 of last 4 years. 
 
Investor Plus: Must reside in 
NZ 44 days in 2 of last 3 years. 
Palau Elite Resident 
Visa 
2007 10 year 
residency. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
US$20,000 fee and purchase or lease a property worth 
US$250,000. Economic self-sufficiency required.  
 
Employment not permitted. 
Medical Insurance required. 
Panama Investor Visa 1960 Permanent 
Residency (3 
year residency 





Financial Capital:  
 
US$60,000/ $80,000 investment in government-approved 
agriculture or reforestation projects; or US$300,000 
investment in either real estate or fixed-term three-year bank 
deposits; or US$200,000 purchase of “non-citizenship 
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Portugal  Residency For 
Investors 












Acquisition of property above €500,000 (US$600,000); or 
transfer of funds above €1 Million (US$1.2 million); or 
create 10 new jobs. 
Reside in country 7 days in first 
year and 14 per 2 years 
thereafter. 
Romania Residency by 
Investment 





after 8 years 




Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
€100,000 (US$120,000) (stock company)/ €70,000 
(US$76,000) limited companies; or create 10 jobs (limited 





Knowledge of language, culture, constitution and anthem.  
 
Loyalty to the Romanian state. 
              
  
St. Kitts 
and Nevis  
Citizenship By 
Investment 





US$250,000 Non-refundable charity donation to the Sugar 
Industry Diversification Foundation; or US$400,000 
Investment in a designated recoverable real estate project. 
 
 
Seychelles  Permanent 
Residence for 
Investors 





in country for 
11 years. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
Invest US$1 million in a business in Seychelles. 
Must have resided in 
Seychelles for 1 year or must 






2003 Residency Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
Business investment and/or real estate in Sint Maarten with 
a total value of ANG 900,000 (US$500,000). 
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Singapore1  Financial 
Investor 
Scheme 




SGD $5 million (US$4.5 million) in assets held in Singapore 
for five years. 
2010 revision: Personal assets of SGD $20 million (US$14 
million) – and at least SGD $10 million (US$7 million) of 
assets held in Singapore for five years. 
 
 





after 2 years. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
SGD $2.5 million (US$2.25 million) investment in 
government-approved venture capital fund, new business or 
existing business in Singapore; or SGD $5 million (US$4.5 
million) investment in a financial institution authorized by 






Male offspring under 21 years 
of age will be liable for 
National Service. 
Slovakia   Article 7 
Citizenship Act 
2011 Citizenship if 
person has 
been resident 
in Slovakia for 
8 consecutive 
years prior to 
the application 





Other Financial and/or Human Capital: 
 
Person who is someone of special benefit to Slovakia in the 
area of economics, science, technology, culture, sport or 
society, or the person's acquisition is otherwise in the 
interest of the country. Reasonable knowledge of language 
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Slovenia Article 7 
Citizenship Act 
2013 Citizenship if 
person has 
been resident 
in Slovenia for 
10 years, of 
which 5 were 
continuous, 





Other Financial and/or Human Capital: 
 
Person is someone of special benefit to Slovakia in the area 
of economics, science, technology, culture, sport or society, 
or if the person's acquisition is otherwise in the interest of 
the country. Economically self-sufficiency and knowledge 












Must not pose a threat to public 
order, security or national 
defence. Must pledge oath to 
respect the free democratic 




Business Visa 2014 24 month 
renewable 
residency 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
  
Proof of ZAR 5 million (US$360,000) in cash; or a capital 
investment of ZAR 5 million in a business with 60percent 
South African employees (minimum five South African 
citizens or permanent residents). 
 
 
Spain        Investor visa 
category under 
Law to Support 
Entrepreneurs 











€500,000 (US$6 million) investment in real estate; or €1 
million (US$1.2 million) bank deposit; or €2 million 
(US$2.4 million) government bond. 
Investor must reside in country 
for 183 days per annum. 






Fee Financial Capital: 
 
CHF ₣150,000 - CHF ₣1 million (US$150,000- 1 million) 
annual lump sum taxation fee, depending on the chosen 
Swiss canton of residence. Investor must own or be renting 
real estate in Switzerland. Economic self-sufficiency 
required. 
 
Employment not permitted. 
Must not have resided in 
Switzerland during last 10 
years.  















 Financial Capital: 
  
Registration of a lease to land on the uninhabited island of 
Fonualei.  
















Risk Capital Financial Capital:  
 
Fee of $25,000 and investment of not less than US$300,000 
in construction of a new home, or in renovation of a 
distressed property as a home for the applicant on the islands 
of Grand Turk, Salt Cay, South Caicos, Middle Caicos or 
North Caicos (US$1 million for other islands); or investment 
of US$750,000 in a business or enterprise in Grand Turk, 
Salt Cay, South Caicos, Middle Caicos or North Caicos 
which business generates employment for persons in TCI 
(minimum 60percent TCI nationals or permanent residents) 







Real estate investment visas not 




Investor Visa 2002 3 year 
residency 
permit. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
AED 1 million (US$270,000)  investment in real estate and 
monthly income over AED 10,000 (US$2,700). 
 
Employment not permitted. 
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United 
Kingdom         
























after 3 years. 
b) Continuous 
residence for 3 
years, (5 years 






Investor Visa: £2 million (US$3 million) government bonds, 
loan or share capital held over 5 years; or £5 million (US$7.7 
million) government bonds, loan or share capital; or £10 
million (US$15 million)  government bonds, loan or share 
capital. 
Entrepreneur Visa:  
a) Invest £200,000 (US$300,000) in UK businesses; or have 
access to £50,000  (US$77,000) investment from venture 
capital firms regulated by the Financial Services Authority); 
one or more UK entrepreneurial seed funding competitions 
listed as endorsed on the UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) 
website; or, one or more UK Government departments or 
devolved Government departments in Scotland, Wales or 
Northern Ireland, made available by the department(s) for 
the specific purpose of establishing or expanding a UK 
business. Must create 10 new jobs. 
b) Establish a new UK business that has had an income of at 
least £5 million (US$7.7 million) in 3 years; or investment 
in existing business that has resulted in £5 million (US$7.7 
million) net profit. 
 
Human Capital: 
All: English language 
Business Management and Investor Visa: Must also have 
and knowledge of life in the UK 
 
Investor and Business 
Management Visa: Must reside 
in UK 185 days a year. 
 
Entrepreneur Visa: Must 
complete a continuous 
residence period of 3 or 5 years 
dependant on the level of 
business activity in the UK. Not 
permitted to access public 
funds or to take employment 
outside of the eligible business. 
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United 
States  
EB-5 Program 1990 Conditional 





residence if 10 
full-time jobs 
are created or 
preserved. 
Risk Capital Financial Capital: 
 
US$1 million private sector investment held over 5 years 
which also creates 10 full-time jobs; or US$500,000 
investment through regional centre program in target 
employment areas that creates or sustains at least ten local 














Engagement in day-to-day 
managerial duties or provide 
input into policy formulation.                     
Must reside in country 219 days 
a year. 










































Economic Rehabilitation after Pam: US$162,000 donation. 
Permanent Residence Program: US$3236 fee for visa. Must 
apply in Hong Kong, Macau, China or Taiwan. 
Capital Investment Immigration Plan: Establish a Vanuatu 
International Company worth US$260,000. Deposit not less 
than US$100,000 in a Vanuatu Financial Institution, part 
investment and part fees. To qualify for citizenship must 
waive repayment of the Vanuatu Government bonds issued; 
and donate to the Vanuatu Government a further 25percent 
of investment made under the Plan. 
 
Sources for information in this table are available on request. 
 











     
     
    
     
     
  
  
Investment Migration Papers is a multi-disciplinary peer-reviewed academic publication 
dedicated to the analysis of the proliferation of citizenship and residence by investment around 
the world. The series aims to advance understanding of the law, politics, economics and history of 
investment migration, including residence and citizenship by investment. The papers analyse the 
processes and long-term implications of investment migration and examine how investment 
migration programmes function in different countries around the globe. 
 
Two types of papers are published: 
 
Research papers provide a venue for communicating high quality academic research in the field 
of investment migration. 
 
Policy briefs provide a venue for practitioners and analysts to share their insights regarding 
relevant developments in a particular country/region of interest to the readers of the Papers. 
 
Investment Migration Papers are published by the Investment Migration Council (IMC). The IMC 
is the worldwide association for Investor Immigration and Citizenship-by-Investment, bringing 
together the leading stakeholders in the field and giving the industry a voice. The IMC sets the 
standards on a global level and interacts with other professional associations, governments and 
international organisations in relation to investment migration. The IMC helps to improve public 
understanding of the issues faced by clients and governments in this area and promotes education 
and high professional standards among its members. 
 
